Hegels Korrespondenz vermittelt eine Fülle von Einblicken und Aufschlüssen in philosophischer, gesellschaftlicher, kulturgeschichtlicher, politischer und personeller Hinsicht. Die Anmerkungen bieten für jeden Brief biographische, bibliographische, historische und sonstige sachliche Hinweise und Erläuterungen. Band 1 beginnt mit der Schulzeit in Stuttgart, umfaßt die Zeit im Tübinger Stift, Habilitation in Jena, seine Tätigkeit als Redakteur der Bamberger Zeitung und reicht bis zu seiner Arbeit als Rektor des Nürnberger Gymnasiums. Band 2 zeigt Hegel zunächst noch in seiner Nürnberger Zeit und schreitet dann fort (...) über seine Heidelberger Professur bis zu seiner Vorlesungstätigkeit in Berlin als Nachfolger auf dem Lehrstuhl Fichtes. Band 3 bringt die Korrespondenzen bis zum Tode Hegels im November 1831. In diese Zeit fallen sowohl seine Ernennung zum Rektor der Berliner Universität als auch seine Reisen nach Wien, Paris und Prag. Band 4 bringt in zwei Teilen Dokumente zu Hegels Leben und enthält neben Nachträgen ein etwa 2.000 Namen umfassendes Register. Jedem Namen sind biographische Notizen beigegeben, die insbesondere auf das Verhältnis des Genannten zu Hegel eingehen. (shrink)

Band 3 bringt die Korrespondenzen bis zum Tode Hegels im November 1831. In diese Zeit fallen sowohl seine Ernennung zum Rektor der Berliner Universität als auch seine Reisen nach Wien, Paris und Prag.

This text is a collection of articles and documents that was put together in an attempt to fill some of the gaps in the recent history of Austrian philosophy. The articles deal primarily with the development of philosophy at the University of Vienna during the years of Nazi rule, and the dis/continuities evident in that development both before 1938 and after 1945. The documents attached in the appendix reveal the continuing difficulty of an open discussion of the historical legacy of (...) academic philosophy in Vienna, decades after the passing of the worst years in Austrian history. (shrink)

Our report and bibliography concentrate on research in the philosophy of science carried out in Austria within the last 20 years. The term 'philosophy of science' is here to be understood in the broad sense of 'Wissenschaftstheorie', that is, syntactics, semantics and pragmatics of the natural sciences and of the humanities, including law. After a general introduction to the philosophy of science scene in Austria, we report about those institutions in Austria at which relevant research has been conducted, starting with (...) institutions in Graz and then continuing - in alphabetical order - with institutions in Innsbruck, Klagenfurt, Linz, Salzburg, and Wien. Our report is supplemented by a bibliography; please note that this contains only references to original publications which deal mainly with questions in the philosophy of science, hence no contributions to lexica, no reviews, no translations, no articles in mass media, no editorial and no unpublished works are cited. Finally, there is an appendix, Alphabetical List of Austrian Institutions at which Philosophy of Science is Conducted, to facilitate communication between you and Austrian philosophers in whose work you may become interested by reading this report. (shrink)

This book collects essays from the 2006 and 2007 International Philosophy Colloquia Evian, centred around a central problem in the philosophy of mind: the relationship between the human faculty of sensory experience and the faculty of conceptual reflection, that is self-consciousness. Containing articles by philosophers of eight nationalities, in three languages (English, French, German), and of "analytical" as well as "continental" provenance, it beautifully represents the spirit of the colloquia. Authors include Joshua Andresen (AU Beirut), Valérie Aucouturier (Kent U / (...) U Paris I), Karin de Boer (KU Leuven), Santiago Echeverri (U Genève), Roberto Farneti (LU Bolzano), Tim Henning (JLU Giessen), Felix Koch (Columbia U), Christophe Laudou (Madrid), David Lauer (FU Berlin), Jason Leddington (Bucknell U), Nicolas Monseu (UC Louvain), Soraya Nour (HU Berlin), Hans Bernhard Schmid (U Wien), Henning Tegtmeyer (U Leipzig). (shrink)

Sumantra Ghoshal’s condemnation of “bad management theories” that were “destroying good management practices” has not lost any of its salience, after a decade. Management theories anchored in agency theory (and neo-classical economics generally) continue to abet the financialization of society and undermine the functioning of business. An alternative approach (drawn from a more classic institutional, new ecological, and refocused ethical approaches) is reviewed.

Written in the 1960s, TRUTH AND METHOD is Gadamer's magnum opus.

The “Tower of London” puzzle was adapted to tablet PCs to be used as a clinical bedside test. “Iso-problems”, a specific class of problems, require identical moves but ball colours are permuted. Thus difficulty is the same even if the appearance is different. We wanted to determine the impact of these as yet little-studied tasks and hypothesised that there may be a learning effect specific to them (the “iso-effect”). We interspersed a set of six iso-problems within one selection of 22 (...) tasks and analysed problem solving by 81 healthy adults (mean age 41.6 years). Participants showed learning across iso-problems (less time, fewer moves, increasingly efficient solutions). This effect was distinct from general learning, as was obvious from comparison with a series of non-isomorphic tasks. However, participants seem not to be aware of solving such problems. This “iso-effect” may be related to implicit memory, a domain that so far has not been assessed using the Tower of London. (shrink)

George Berkeley (1685-1753) is the superstar of Irish Philosophy. He entered Trinity College, Dublin, in 1700 and became a fellow in 1707. In 1724 he resigned his Fellowship to become Dean of Derry, and in 1734 he was made Bishop of Cloyne. He settled in Oxford in 1752 and died the following year. The work of George Berkeley is marked by its diversity and range. His writings take in such topics as mathematics, psychology, politics, health, economics, deism and education, as (...) well as that with which he is most associated - philosophy. Whatever topic he dealt with, his grasp of the subject matter was always impressive and his criticisms of his contemporaries often acute. Among the most noteable of the British Empiricists, he took his starting point from Locke's new 'way of ideas', but he rejected abstract ideas and the possibility of real existence outside perception. It is for this doctrine that he is most known - that there is no such thing as matter, and that things are collections of ideas which can exist only in our minds and only for so long as they are perceived. This philosophy, summed up in his phrase 'to be is to be perceived', he termed 'immaterialism'. A.C. Fraser's collection includes a series of what were previously unpublished notes by Berkeley on all the main topics of his philosophy. This, the 1901 edition, was the first complete edition of his works. (shrink)

A brilliant and comprehensive history of the creation of the modern Western mind. Soul Machine takes us back to the origins of modernity, a time when a crisis in religious authority and the scientific revolution led to searching questions about the nature of human inner life. This is the story of how a new concept—the mind—emerged as a potential solution, one that was part soul and part machine, but fully neither. In this groundbreaking work, award-winning historian George Makari shows how (...) writers, philosophers, physicians, and anatomists worked to construct notions of the mind as not an ethereal thing, but a natural one. From the ascent of Oliver Cromwell to the fall of Napoleon, seminal thinkers like Hobbes, Locke, Diderot, and Kant worked alongside often-forgotten brain specialists, physiologists, and alienists in the hopes of mapping the inner world. Conducted in a cauldron of political turmoil, these frequently shocking, always embattled efforts would give rise to psychiatry, mind sciences such as phrenology, and radically new visions of the self. Further, they would be crucial to the establishment of secular ethics and political liberalism. Boldly original, wide-ranging, and brilliantly synthetic, Soul Machine gives us a masterful, new account of the making of the modern Western mind. (shrink)

A major challenge in biology is to explain why some groups have thousands or millions of species whereas others have few. Here, I review the causes of this variation. New studies reveal that higher species numbers in many major groups are explained by higher diversification rates (and traits that accelerate these rates). These traits span most of biology (e.g. genomics, ecology, morphology). Rather than simply testing individual traits, research should now focus on comparing how much variation in diversification rates is (...) explained by different types of traits. For example, is local‐scale ecology (e.g. microhabitat, diet) more important than large‐scale climate (e.g. occurring in tropical vs. temperate regions)? Are traits based on particular values (e.g. smaller body sizes) more important than those based on rates of change (e.g. faster size evolution)? I review recent results on the relative importance of different traits for driving diversification, and present a framework for future research. (shrink)

Throughout The Blessed and Boundless God, he proves his doctrine by demonstrating God's incomparableness in His being, attributes, works, and words. Swinnock is a pastor-theologian who views theology as the means by which we grow in acquaintance with God and, consequently, in godliness.

Some moral theorists argue that innocent beneficiaries of wrongdoing may have special remedial duties to address the hardships suffered by the victims of the wrongdoing. These arguments generally aim to simply motivate the idea that being a beneficiary can provide an independent ground for charging agents with remedial duties to the victims of wrongdoing. Consequently, they have neglected contexts in which it is implausible to charge beneficiaries with remedial duties to the victims of wrongdoing, thereby failing to explore the limits (...) of the benefiting relation in detail. Our aim in this article is to identify a criterion to distinguish contexts in which innocent beneficiaries plausibly bear remedial duties to the victims of wrongdoing from those in which they do not. We argue that innocent beneficiaries incur special duties to the victims of wrongdoing if and only if receiving and retaining the benefits sustains wrongful harm. We develop this criterion by identifying and explicating two general modes of sustaining wrongful harm. We also show that our criterion offers a general explanation for why some innocent beneficiaries incur a special duty to the victims of wrongdoing while others do not. By sustaining wrongful harm, beneficiaries-with-duties contribute to wrongful harm, and we ordinarily have relatively stringent moral requirements against contributing to wrongful harm. On our account, innocently benefiting from wrongdoing _per se_ does not generate duties to the victims of wrongdoing. Rather, beneficiaries acquire such duties because their receipt and retention of the benefits of wrongdoing contribute to the persistence of the wrongful harm suffered by the victim. We conclude by showing that our proposed criterion also illuminates why there can be reasonable disagreement about whether beneficiaries have a duty to victims in some social contexts. (shrink)

This study investigated how problem solvers get into and out of a state of impasse while solving difficult problems. 47 participants had to decipher the secret method behind 33 magic tricks while r...

Recent methodological debates regarding the place of feasibility considerations in normative political theory are hindered for want of a rigorous model of the feasibility frontier. To address this shortfall, I present an analysis of feasibility that generalizes the economic concept of a production possibility frontier and then develop a rigorous model of the feasibility frontier using the familiar possible worlds technology. I then show that this model has significant methodological implications for political philosophy. On the Target View, a political ideal (...) presents a long-term goal for morally progressive reform efforts and, thus, serves as an important reference point for our specification of normative political principles. I use the model to show that we can- not reasonably expect that adopting political ideals as long-term reform objectives will guide us toward the realization of morally optimal feasible states of affairs. I conclude by proposing that political philosophers turn their attention to the analysis of actual social failures rather than political ideals. (shrink)

Lipsey and Lancaster's "general theory of second best" is widely thought to have significant implications for applied theorizing about the institutions and policies that most effectively implement abstract normative principles. It is also widely thought to have little significance for theorizing about which abstract normative principles we ought to implement. Contrary to this conventional wisdom, I show how the second-best theorem can be extended to myriad domains beyond applied normative theorizing, and in particular to more abstract theorizing about the normative (...) principles we should aim to implement. I start by separating the mathematical model used to prove the second-best theorem from its familiar economic interpretation. I then develop an alternative normative-theoretic interpretation of the model, which yields a novel second best theorem for idealistic normative theory. My method for developing this interpretation provides a template for developing additional interpretations that can extend the reach of the second-best theorem beyond normative theoretical domains. I also show how, within any domain, the implications of the second-best theorem are more specific than is typically thought. I conclude with some brief remarks on the value of mathematical models for conceptual exploration. (shrink)

It is conventional wisdom among political philosophers that ideal principles of justice must guide our attempts to design institutions to avert actual injustice. Call this the ideal guidance approach. I argue that this view is misguided— ideal principles of justice are not appropriate "guiding principles" that actual institutions must aim to realize, even if only approximately. Fortunately, the conventional wisdom is also avoidable. In this paper, I develop an alternative approach to institutional design, which I call institutional failure analysis. The (...) basic intuition of this approach is that our moral assessment of institutional proposals is most effective when we proceed from a detailed understanding of the causal processes generating problematic social outcomes. Failure analysis takes the institutional primary design task to be obviating or averting institutional failures. Consequently, failure analysis enables theorists to prescribe more effective solutions to actual injustice because its focuses on understanding the injustice, rather than specifying an ideal of justice. (shrink)

Political philosophers frequently claim that political ideals can provide normative guidance for unjust and otherwise nonideal circumstances. This is mistaken. This paper demonstrates that political ideals contribute nothing to our understanding of the normative principles we should satisfy amidst unjust or otherwise nonideal circumstances.

Do motivational limitations due to human nature constrain the demands of justice? Among those who say no, David Estlund offers perhaps the most compelling argument. Taking Estlund’s analysis of “ability” as a starting point, I show that motivational deficiencies can constrain the demands of justice under at least one common circumstance — that the motivationally-deficient agent makes a good faith effort to overcome her deficiency. In fact, my argument implies something stronger; namely, that the demands of justice are constrained by (...) what people are sufficiently likely to be motivated to do. Thus, contrary to the prevailing wisdom, it is the business of ideal theory — not just nonideal theory — to work with the motivational capacities people are likely enough to have. (See also Estlund's reply in the same issue of EJPT and my rejoinder on Philpapers.). (shrink)

Numerous philosophers allege that the "general theory of second best" (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956) poses a challenge to the Target View, which asserts that real world reform efforts should aim to establish arrangements that satisfy the constitutive features of ideal just states of affairs. I demonstrate two claims that are relevant in this context. First, I show that the theory of second best fails to present a compelling challenge to the Target View in general. But, second, the theory of second (...) best requires ideal theorists to undertake certain kinds of causal and comparative analyses that are typically thought to lie beyond the borders of conventional ideal theory. (shrink)

The article deals with several issues related to the concept of happiness that emerge from Plato’s triptych: the Gorgias, the Republic and the Laws. The focus is on (1) the question of the alleged overcoming of the eudaimonistic imperative, i.e., natural human pursuit of happiness, in the didactic message of the Republic; (2) the question of to what extent the path of cognition ending in the contemplation of the perfect being is at the same time a strive for the supreme (...) happiness; (3) the dilemma of choosing between a reductive and a cumulative model of complete satisfaction in human life; and finally (4) the problem of affiliative condi­tions of full life satisfaction. (shrink)

I discuss Gheaus's (2013) argument against the claim that the requirements of justice are not constrained by feasibility concerns. I show that the general strategy exemplified by this argument is not only dialectically puzzling, but also imposes a heavy cost on theories of justice -- puzzling because it simply sidesteps a presupposition of any plausible formulation of the so-called "feasibility requirement"; costly because it it deprives justice of its normative implications for action. I also show that Gheaus's attempt to recover (...) this normative force presupposes an epistemic dimension to the feasibility requirement that most proponents of that requirement would reject. (shrink)

Eva Erman and Niklas Möller have recently presented a trenchant critique of my (2015) argument that ideal normative theories are uninformative for certain practical purposes. Their criticisms are largely correct. In this note, I develop the ideas behind my earlier argument in a way that circumvents their critique and explains more clearly why ideal theory is uninformative for certain purposes while leaving open the possibility that it might be informative for other purposes.

Many political philosophers hold the Feasible Alternatives Principle (FAP): justice demands that we implement some reform of international institutions P only if P is feasible and P improves upon the status quo from the standpoint of justice. The FAP implies that any argument for a moral requirement to implement P must incorporate claims whose content pertains to the causal processes that explain the current state of affairs. Yet, philosophers routinely neglect the need to attend to actual causal processes. This undermines (...) their arguments concerning moral requirements to reform international institutions. The upshot is that philosophers’ arguments must engage in causal analysis to a greater extent than is typical. -/- [Supplement: Handout available at http://db.tt/fyuVW3Xv]. (shrink)

This article brings to light some of the characteristics of the pervasive parental overpermissiveness and hyper-protectionism that unfortunately have made their way into our culture. With the aid of philosophers of education, such as Locke, Rousseau, and Dewey, I expose the corrosive effects that parental overindulgence has on the potential happiness of those in their charge, as well as on those who share their social space. As these philosophers warned long ago, by overindulging their desires, parents either overextend their children’s (...) expectations well beyond the reality of their capabilities or they squash their initiative by usurping their independence. In either case, parents cripple their children’s autonomy and thereby detract from the real work needed to develop habits and dispositions necessary to plan and carry out achievable accomplishments that are integral for sustained and enduring happiness. Put more simply, overindulgence, to the extent this impedes the development of requisite skills for achieving happiness and developing a sense of social responsibility, becomes a disguised form of child abuse. (shrink)